Absh.act. The nucleolus is a unique solut~on concept for a cooperative game. It belongs to the kernel of the game. Given m games over disjoint sets of players and an m-player game, one defines a compound game over the union of the nt disjoint sets. These m games are the components and the above twplayer game is called the quotlent.
1
1. Introduction. The nucleolus of a cooperative game was defined by D. Schmeidler in [lo] . It is a solution concept for a characteristic function game which consists of a unique point. As a point of the kernel of the game (see [2] ) the nucleolus reflects strength relations between players and symmetry properties of the characteristic function.
Compound simple games were defined by L. S. Shapley in [ I I] . Shapley proved in [12] , [13] , [14] (also proved by G. Owen in [9] ) that von NeumannMorgenstern solutions of the component games compose in a natural manner which results in a solution of the compound game. Kernels have a very similar property (see [ 5 ] ) .
The nucleolus of the product of simple games was characterized in [4] . In most of the cases (when the maximum excesses with respect to the nucleoluses of the component games are distinct) the nucleolus of the product coincides with the nucleolus of the component the maximum excess of which is the least. In this case the players in the other components get zero. When the maximum excesses in the components are not distinct the nucleolus ofthe product is a convex combination of the components' nucleoluses.
In this paper we generalize the results of [4] . A compound simple game is a tensor composition (see [9] ) with simple components. In view of the results presented here, the computation of the nucleolus of a decomposable game (with simple components) is easier than that of a prime one. It is equivalent to the computation of the components' nucleoluses plus a similar computation in the quotient game.
That means (3.4) e(S,, V) 2 . . . 2 e(S2,, v), (3.5) e(Tl, y) l . . . 2 e(T2n, y).
Let i, (1 5 i , 5 2") be the first index of unequal excesses : (3.61 e(Sio, V) < 4T0, Y), (3.7)
i < io * e(S,, V) = e(T,, y).
We shall prove that for every i < i,, (3.8) e(Si , v) = e(Si, y) .
First, (3.9) @,, -1 , V) > e(S,,, V) (otherwise (3.5) and (3.7) contradict (3.6)). Let i* (1 5 i* 5 2") be defined by (3.10) e(Si*, V) f 6 , Y )
and Without loss of generality we assume that for every i > i*, (3.12) e(S,., V) = e(S,, v) * e(Si*, y) 2 e(Si, y) and for every i < i*, Si = T . It can be easily seen that i* i , . We sha.11 prove that
Statements (3.7), (3.10) and (3.1 3) imply Statements (3.9) and (3.13) imply There exists c > 0 such that the imputation z = (1 -c)v + ~y satislies for every i > i* (see (3.12)) e(Si*, z ) = (1 -c)e(Si*, v) + ee(Si*, y) = e(Si, z) Also, (3.1 1) implies and (3.14) implies Statements (3.16H3.18) imply that B(z) precedes 0(v) in the lexicographical order on R2" in contradiction to the assumption that v is the nucleolus. Thus, i* = i, and (3.8) is proved. Relation (3.1) follows from (3.6) and (3.8) .
The nucleolus was defined to be an imputation whose excesses vector is a lexicographical minimum. In order to characterize the nucleolus of a compound game we would like to define here a general lexicographical problem. PROBLEM 3.2. Given a set of m affine functionals over R".
we denote by a ( x ) an m-tuple whose components are the numbers u,(x), ; = 1 , . . . , m, arranged in decreasing order. Given a convex polytope X c Rn, our problem is to find x, E X such that u(xo) is minimal in the lexicographical order on R m in the set ja(x) : x E X 1 .
Rernark 3.3.
One possible way to solve an n-dimensional lexicographical problem with m functionals is by solving at most min (m, n) linear problems (see [I] ). The first one is: Minimize t subject to the constraints Suppose X , is the set of the solutions to the kth problem and A , is the set of indices (i) The nuclrolus with respect to 9 is defined to be the set of the solutions of the lexicographical problem over X ( T ) with the functionals e(S, x ) , S E .Y. We denote this set by ./l;,(T).
(ii (3.26) . (3.27) .#,(I-
Then .&(T) is a nucleo-sufficient collection in T.
Proof 
4). Since d ( T ) =
U Y4 **, it is sufficient to prove that . I I is a 1 ; ) nucleo-sufficient collection, i.e., For every player i there is a winning coalition S such that i $ S. Also, S U {if is winning because of the monotonicity. If { i ) is not winning, then for every x E X ( r ) , Moreover, x{'' is a linear combination of xS and XSu(i' and therefore e ( { i ) , x ) may be omitted throughout the computation of the nucleolus (see Remark 3.3) . Thus, (3.35) is proved.
The nucleolus of a simple committee-game.
In this section we prove that the nucleolus of a simple committee-game is the barycentric projection of the nucleolus of the grand game on this committee. Thus, strength relations between the members of the committee, as reflected in the nucleolus, are the same in the committee-game and in the grand game.
We shall use the notation
when dealing with Problem 3.2. Proof. The proof is ~mmediate if x(C) = 0. If I E C and x , > 0, let S E 9 ( x ) such t h a t i~S ( s e e L e m m a 4 , 1 ) . I f S n C$%,,then and, thus, S 4 g(x)-a contradiction ! We consider 9 ( X ) also as a set of coalitions; no confusion may be caused since there is a one-toone correspondence between coalitions and their excesses. DEFINITION 4.3. Given a monotonic game r = ( N ; v), a simple committeegame rc = (C; q;) and an imputation x such that x(C) # 0, we denote
We call rp) = (C ; w'")) the modification of Tc with respect to x. We shall show that this modification, which does not depend on xi for i E C (but depends on x(C)), does not affect the nucleolus of the committee-game if x E X l ( r ) . We use the notation e',"'(S, y), etc. when these expressions refer to the game r p ) . Let us denote
for any B E % ; and for any B $ %, . 
Since x(C). w t ) is also an excess with respect to 2 (see Definition 4.3) it follows that
Since for every z E X(rC), 1 > ,+,g).
Thus, the winning coalitions in T, have (in the modified committee-game) a value which is still greater than that of the losing coalitions. Moreover, it also follows that (4.19) ~(r',")) 2 g(rc). LEMMA 4.6. Let r = ( N ; c) be u monotonic gunw und let T, = (C; f4,) be u simple committee-gume with no veto players. Under these conditions, for ecery i E C there is S E Y4& such that i $ S and S E 2',"'(y) ,for ecery y E X ,(Iy',"').
Proof: (a) Suppose, per absurdum, that i E C and y E X ,(I-?)) such that for every S E fb;, S E C&(Cx)(y) implies i E S. Since i is not a veto player, there exists So E $c such that i $ So. Thus, So $5$'(y) and, therefore, for every s H;. n C~O~) , (4.20) e',")(S, y) > e',")(S,, y) .
It thus follows that for every S E 7%; fl 9(Cx'(y) there i s i $ S ( j # i) such that yj > 0. Let E be such that 0 < E < min jyj:j # i, yj # 0 ) and define y* by
It follows that for every S 6 9FX)(y), (4.22) ey'(S, y*) < eF'(S. y ) .
If E is small enough, then $4, n 9',"'(y*) c Yb, fl Lic,"'(y) in contradiction to the assumption that j E X ,(r:')). We have proved that for every I E C and y E X,(r:") there is S E Y%( fl f/F1(j) such that r E S.
(b) The existence of S was proved for every y E X,(Tp'). Particularly, that is true for every y In the set It can be inferred from Lemma 3.1 that y E XT and z E X I imply V',"'(y) c 'l',"'(z) and, therefore, S E %?'(z) for every z E X , (r' , ")).
LEMMA 4.7. Let = (N ; v) be a monotonicgame and let r, = (C ; 7%;) be u simple committee-game. lf'x E X l ( r ) is such that x(C) > 0 then the nucleolus ofr, coincides with the nucleolus of' r ' , " ' with respect to X(Tc).
Proof: (a) If there are veto players in T,, then o(F,) = 0 and (4.14) implies wy' -1 2 wg'. Thus, for every y E X(r,) and S E ' U i , ey'(S, y ) 2 wg) and the respective lexicographical problems differ by a constant. . Suppose {i) $ W, and S E W i is such that i $ S and y E X l ( r F ) ) implies S E IlrF'(y) (see Lemma 4.6). Under these conditions, for every j. E X l ( r F ) ) (according to Lemmas 4.4 and 4.6) Since %(i' = ZSu(i' -x~, it follows, in view of (4.24), that the constraint eF)({i),jl) 5 t may be omitted from the problem of the nucleolus of T',") (see Remark 3.3). The collection fb ' ,* is thus nucleo-sufficient in T',"'. That implies that the nuclei problems in the games r',") and TC have the same solution. Hp'(xc) = (ep)(T1 , x'), . . . , ey)(~,~'I, xC)).
Let i , be defined by (4.27) e?'(Sio, vC) < e?' (TT;, , x'),
Without loss of generality we assume that 
W = { S C N : S~N , E % '~O~S~N , E % '~] . T~~~~O~U C~~, O
where YV' = {S c N : S' n N, E -,W1 and S f l N, E I%.,) was investigated and its nucleolus was characterized in [4] . Let r = ( N ; YV) be the sum r = I-, @ T,.
We shall prove that for every x E X,(T), N 1 ) x 1 + x ( N , ) x~.
There is e > 0 such that the imputation satisfies This means that the computation of the nucleolus is equivalent to the computation of the nucleoluses of the summands. The coefficient cr is a by-product of this computation.
The nucleolus of a compound game.
According to the preceding section the nucleolus of a simple committee-game is the barycentric projection of the nucleolus of the grand game on that committee. In a compound game with simple components the set of players, N , is a union of disjoint committees. Thus, the nucleolus of the compound game is a convex combination of the nucleoluses of the component games (the nucleolus of a component game is changed to an imputation in the grand game by adding zeros). This combination depends only on the two highest levels of excesses in the components' nucleoluses. It is a solution of a lexicographical problem.
Let The payoffs to the losing coalitions will be denoted by
For every T c M denote
For every T c M and ,j E J ( T ) let be an affine functional such that for every
. , am)(see (5.1)) is the solution of' the lexicogruphical problem with the functionals a(T;j) ( T c M , j~ J ( T ) ) and the polytope X(T,).
The proof follows from the fact that for every Obviously, this point cannot be presented as
